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FREGE, FATHER OF DISJUNCTIVISM
The concept of the ‘inner picture’ is misleading, for this concept uses the ‘outer picture’ as a model; 
and yet the uses of the words for these concepts are no more like one another than those of 
‘numeral’ and ‘number’. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, IIxi (p. 196))
Why disjunctivism, its seeming complexities and quirks? In the case of perception, 
Frege has a compelling answer. It gains him claim to fatherhood. (Cook Wilson is the 
natural parent in the case of knowledge. For singular thought, Russell will do as 
inspiration. The case of (reasons for) action remains to be explored.) My main aim here 
is to make Frege’s case. A subsidiary aim is to begin to sketch some of its wider 
implications for the nature of our ‘inner lives’.
Disjunctivism about perception and disjunctivism about knowledge oppose a 
common form of target. The target posits an ingredient in seeing, say, a lemon, or 
knowing there to be one, which could also be present in some range of cases where 
there was no such thing to see, or to know. For seeing, the ingredient is something of 
which the experience affords awareness. For knowing, it is an attitude one could hold 
anyway. The target (often) also holds that for one to see, or know, the thing in question 
is for this further ingredient to be present under suitable conditions, of whose obtaining 
one need not be aware.
But there is a disanalogy. Disjunctivism about perception concerns what 
experience provides to be responded to—if appearances, then things  appearing (as 
experienced) thus and so, not one’s holding of an attitude. Disjunctivism about 
knowledge concerns our responses—the idea of a response which may, or may not, be 
knowledge. For knowing P, there does seem  to be an attitude one could hold anyway 
even were there no such thing to know, namely, thinking that P. Current disjunctivists—
as opposed to Cook Wilson—tend to grant that point. Their brief is then that there are 
no surrounding conditions which could make mere thinking so into knowledge. In the 
case of perception, it is nothing like apparent that there is  the ingredient the target 
posits. Disjunctivism’s brief, as presented here, will be that there is not. In which case, 
the further question whether seeing could be a hybrid of this ingredient and 
surrounding conditions lapses. Of course, something may look yellow, as encountered 
by an observer, where nothing is  yellow. But such banal facts do not make for the 
ingredient the target wants there to be.
I will begin here by developing Frege’s master point, with no further concern, for 
the moment, for what disjunctivism might be. I will then apply the point, first to a 
2special form of disjunctivism’s target, and then, generalizing the target, to a different 
case. This last case will be a form of intentionalism about perception. Some 
intentionalists believe that the supposedly recognized evils of sense datum theory are 
avoided simply by eschewing qualia, or special unworldly objects with visual, or other 
perceptual properties. Frege’s lesson is that this simply is not so. To re-order one idea of 
Frege’s: to judge is to expose oneself to error; there is something to judge to be one way 
or another only where something affords the opportunity so to expose oneself; such 
opportunities occur only in an environment. Intentionalism shares with sense datum 
theory a difficulty in respecting this idea.
1. Judgement: Let us think of the environment as home to all things to be met with. That 
subjectless passive is meant to signal two things. First, if something is to be met with, 
then there is no one one must be to meet with it. Second, if something is to be met with, 
then, for any meeting with it, there could have been another. I leave the idea of a 
meeting unexplicated except by example. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, are each a 
form of awareness of things to be met with. One, say, smells the violets. The awareness 
thus afforded is a meeting with them. A proof that there is no largest prime is something 
one meets with, inter alia, in grasping it. The thought that tapirs are porcine may be met 
with in speculating about tapirs—in entertaining it. Perception being of what is to be 
met with, smelling the violets is a kind of meeting with them available to anyone 
suitably placed, and perceptually equipped. There is no one one must be for this.
Perception thus models occasion for a very special kind of attitude. I see a lemon 
only where there is one to be met with. I may respond to the experience with an attitude 
correct or not  precisely according to whether there is a lemon to be met with. What 
correctness would be here points to a certain notion of correctness. The attitude thus 
correct or not exemplifies the special sort at issue here. Frege was concerned with a 
general case thus exemplified: attitudes whose correctness (of the indicated sort) is 
decided solely by things being as they are. He termed these ‘judging’. So will I. The 
general case transcends attitudes towards the perceivable. Our problem: does it also 
transcend attitudes towards what is to be met with?
What is it for correctness to be decided exclusively, and precisely, by how things 
are? For one thing, whatever it is that decides this correctness should do such deciding 
as it does regardless of any thinkers’ attitudes towards its so doing; so it should be there 
to do the deciding it does regardless of any thinkers’ attitudes towards that. How are we 
to understand this? One thing we will need is: such an attitude may  be correct, or 
incorrect; and if it is (in)correct on any taking of it, then it is correct on all. (This leaves 
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out craving duck’s tongues; also, quite likely, finding them delicious. It also makes the 
correctness at issue here contrast with being justified: in my Proustian bedroom, I may 
be unjustified in thinking it is snowing (the thought resting on nothing but intrinsic 
pessimism), while you, looking out the window, may be entirely justified in thinking so. 
But you are correct in the present sense iff I am.
One might want more. But to get this much we also need more. To make sense of 
an attitude being correct on any taking of it, we need to be able to separate what is to be 
correct or incorrect—a certain attitude available to take—from any taking of it. Where 
there is a judging, there must thus be that which is thus judged (a judgement). For us to 
be able to detach a particular attitude taken from a given case of someone standing 
towards things as he does, it must be determinate enough when, in someone’s standing 
towards things as he does, it would be that  attitude (inter alia) which he was taking. 
Which will be determinate enough if, but only if, it is sufficiently determinate how 
someone would stand towards the world (or things being as they are) in taking it.
One might plausibly think it also a requirement on detaching an attitude from 
some holding of attitude that the attitude detached be to be met with (in thought)—in 
grasping, or entertaining, it. Which means: there is no one one need be to take the 
attitude; and that for any taking of it there might have been another. Here, though, this 
calls for argument. Frege’s concern in what follows is with whether, in someone’s 
standing as he does towards things being as they are, there are detachable attitudes for 
him  to take—that things are thus and so—which are available only for him to take, or, 
more generally, meet with. These will be attitudes towards what there is only for him to 
meet with—if not necessarily such-and-such items, in any case such-and-such ways for 
things to be. For there to be such attitudes is for the extent of how things are to 
transcend that of how things to be met with are. What Frege aims to show is that it does 
not.
Perhaps there is a way of counting thoughts on which the thought I think and the 
one you do, where we both think that I am cold are different ones. It all hangs on special 
modes of presentation of oneself. But then there is another. For in such a case each of us 
is right or wrong according to something in particular as to how things are: whether I 
am cold. One of us will be wrong as to that just where the other is. Which identifies an 
attitude we share, specifically, a judgement, we both judge. That there are also ways of 
distinguishing our attitudes is, for the present, beside the point.
In ordinary speech, the verb ‘judge’ has connotations of confronting something 
and sizing it up. I may, inspecting him, judge the man looking at me in the bar to be 
dangerous. But if I merely think, in my cork-lined room that it is snowing (manifesting 
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my pessimism), that is not judging. So we ordinarily speak. But not here. To be a 
judgement is, here, and for Frege, just to be truth-evaluable. To judge is to hold a truth-
evaluable attitude.
To judge a pig to be wallowing is to be exposed to being right or wrong as to 
what is to be met with. What might it be to expose oneself to error, as one ipso facto does 
in judging, as to what is not to be met with?
2. Inner Confrontations: I now start an extended argument. Frege presents it in terms of 
an analogy. This section concerns the first term of that comparison. It does not draw the 
conclusion of the argument. For that the whole analogy is needed. So, in particular, it 
does not decide whether the realm of things for me  to judge extends beyond that of 
judgements as to what is to be met with. It is but a first step towards such decision.
If there is something it is for a rubber ball, or towel, or sunset, to be red, it does 
not follow that there is something it is for the E flat above middle C, or the rate of 
recidivism in Ohio, to be red. Those ideas may yet lack sense. There is, Frege tells us, 
another sort of case where new sense would be called for. He says,
The word ‘red’, if it does not indicate a property of things, but is 
meant to indicate marks of sense-impressions which are part of my 
consciousness, is applicable only in the domain of my 
consciousness. (1918, p. 67)
If I used ‘red’ to speak of things there for only me to meet with, I would not thus be 
speaking of a way for environmental things to be. So if I do use ‘red’ to speak of a way 
for environmental things to be, I cannot be speaking of a way for non-environmental 
things to be. ‘Red’ has a sense in which it speaks of environmental things—balls, towels 
and such. For it to speak of non-environmental matters it would need new sense. For, in 
its environmental sense it does not speak of a way there is for a non-environmental 
thing to be. If I encounter, say, looks, or patches, or visual sensations, to be met with 
only by me, then these can be red  only on a new understanding of what something 
being red would be. So Frege tells us.
Why should this be? The answer must turn on the absence, in the non-
environmental case, of certain materials present in the environmental one; materials 
which, when present, constitute, in whole or part, what it is for something to be red—
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what it is we say of something in so saying. Conspicuously, there are those two features 
the notion to be met with brings on board: there is no one one must be to encounter the 
thing which is red, or its being red; for any encounter with this, there might have been 
another. I will call these features recurrability. Recurring need not take time. I may later 
encounter what I now do. But someone else might encounter what I now do. To be re-
encountered is just to be encountered at least twice.
The notion recognize  fits what can recur. One may register new encounters with 
the already met. One may also register what one encounters as instancing a certain way 
for things to be. Both these notions are of cognitive achievement: one goes right, where 
one might have gone wrong. One will go wrong on the second notion of success where 
one would not meet the supposed instancing in a meeting with what was meant to do it. 
One may similarly go wrong as to what would count as something being thus and so, 
where such is demonstrated by other occasions of having being that in mind.
Recurrability allows making particular sense of ‘would’. That peccary has a 
porcine look. Which means: there is a way it would look. When? On an encounter with it 
(barring reasons for it then not to). For it to have the look is for that to be met with by 
anyone suitably placed and perceptually equipped. A grasp of ‘suitably’ will be a grasp 
of when there would be such an encounter. Peccaries are dangerous in rut. This one 
would have been if in rut. Peccaries, and something being in rut, are both recurrent 
parts of the environment. A grasp of which parts is a grasp of when this peccary would 
have been in rut.
A ball’s being red, as we conceive such things. is something with an etiology and 
with effects. (Being red has effects, which is why stop signs are.) If a ball is red, its so 
being so would be encountered on any meeting with it, barring happenings to change 
its colour. There are facts as to what would, or might, and what might not, do this. 
(Depending on the etiology of its being red, the sun might, or might not, fade the red 
out.) If you encountered a red thing in blue light it might look purple. If you 
encountered it in the dark, you could not detect its redness by looking. Each of these 
banal remarks make sense only given that a suitable ‘would’ also does. If the ball is red, 
then there is a way it would look in blue light. Recurrability gives us such a ‘would’. 
Such facts as to what would be are part of what it is for a ball to be red. Recurrability is 
thus essential to the environmental, sense of ‘red’.
Something is red just when its so being is to be met with. So, whatever it would 
be to meet with something being red, if it is red, then there is that to meet with on an 
indefinite range of occasions. If, say, being red is the sort of thing one can normally tell 
by looking (as one might expect if to be red is to have a certain look), then if the ball is 
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red, that is something one could tell by looking on indefinitely many (actual or possible) 
occasions.
A ball’s being red matters  in a certain way to what there is to encounter in the 
environment. Nature has a large voice in just how. Nature’s being granted such a voice 
is part of what something environmental  being red is. Nature could  so function only 
where a suitable ‘would’ fits. If the shirt is red, it need not be so that there would still be 
that look to be encountered on meeting with it after it was washed. But if not, that is 
because of what, nature being what it is, washing it would do. The key point: for 
something environmental to be red is for nature thus to matter to what would be met 
with in meeting the item. That is part of what it is, here, for something to be red.
So what being red is to be understood to be, and nature, decide jointly, in 
understandable ways, what there would be to be met with if such-and-such were red. 
The role of what is to count as something being red stands out clearly where there are 
contrasting understandings. This setting sun in Hackney is red on one understanding of 
it being so, not on another. How do these understandings differ? On the one, the sun 
need not then look red observed from Bristol. On the other it had better. The 
understandings differ precisely in what would be met with if, on each, the setting 
Hackney sun were red.
One should not expect, in general, to be able to tease apart the work of nature 
from that of what one understands by being red. What mattters is that the whole joint 
enterprise gets off the ground in the environmental case only thanks to what recurrence 
puts in place. That such a joint enterprise is  off the ground is part of what it is for 
something to be red in the usual environmental sense.
Something’s being red matters in determinate ways. For the environmental, what 
this mattering is to is what is to be met with. In the non-environmental case there can be 
no such  mattering. When such mattering is stripped away, what would  it be for 
something to be red? What it would be for an environmental item to be red does not yet 
answer this question. That is why ‘red’ needs new sense to apply in the non-
environmental case.
What might it be for things non-environmental to be red? One might envision the 
following route to an answer. Delete from our usual notion of being red all the ways in 
which something’s being red (or not) is liable to be a matter of what is to be met with. 
Then look at what is left. What is left? One suggestion: for something to be red is for it 
to have a certain look; having that look is a matter of what is to be met with in the 
environmental case. But perhaps there is still something it would be for something non-
environmental to have that look: it is to be, or look, just the same colour as 
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environmental red things. The idea clearly will not do. For it helps itself to the notion of 
looking  thus and so. We know what it is for something environmental to look a certain 
way: there is something one would meet on meeting with it. But that idea does not fit 
the non-environmental case. So how are we to understand looking here? This notion, too, 
needs new sense (or an explanation of why not). There is so far no progress.
To be the same colour might  be to be indistinguishable in colour. But what 
indistinguishability of environmental items comes to does not show what 
indistinguishability of the colours of an environmental and a non-environmental item 
might be. I may aim to make a soap, visually indistinguishable from a certain lemon. I 
succeed or fail according to whether there is a visually detectable feature of the lemon 
not to be met with in the soap (or vice-versa). A detectable feature is one which could be 
met with, and registered, in an indefinitely extensive range of encounters. It is what a 
suitably equipped observer would detect. If there is such a feature, then the suitably 
equipped could distinguish the lemon and the soap in indefinitely many encounters 
with them. There are, anyway, such encounters to be had. None of these ideas makes 
sense in the non-environmental case. For we have not made sense of the idea of what 
would  be so on a meeting with something not to be met with. So, equally, nor of 
someone being able to detect something on a meeting. Someone with an ability is 
someone who would get things right on suitable occasions for its exercise. We do not 
yet know what it would be to get things right as to how things stand with something 
not to be met with. Surely not the same thing that it would be to get things right as to 
what is to be met with.
It is thus not obvious what remains of the notion of being red when its anchoring 
in what is to be met with is stripped away, or how anything left could, all by itself, 
allow us to make sense of something non-environmental being red. If there is no core 
understanding that could do this on its own, there is, equally, no core understanding 
which, on its own, determines what the right new understanding of being red is to be.
Any way for things to be has an intrinsic generality. Not everything  in things 
being as they are would be required for things, or something, to be (or not to be) that 
way. There is what matters to being the way in question, and what does not. There is, 
accordingly, the range of cases in which things being as they were would be things, 
being the way in question. The range is always extendible: for any given members, 
there could always be another. For something in my inner world to be red would be for 
my inner world to be a certain way. It would be for something to be met with only by 
me, perhaps, only on the occasion, to be a certain way. The remarks about any way for 
things to be apply. In my inner world’s being as it is there would be what mattered to 
whether things, or something, was that way, and what did not so matter. There would, 
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accordingly, be the range of cases in which my inner world’s being as it was would  be 
things, or something, in it being the way in question. What is ‘would’ to mean here? 
And what should mattering  in a determinate way amount to? We have, so far, no 
answers to these questions. Perhaps  they have answers. This is but the first stage of an 
extended argument.
If one judged things, or something, non-environmental, to be, or appear, ‘red’, 
what way one thus judged things to be would not be fixed by what it is for something to 
be red. That is Frege’s point. So it remains to be said what one would  thus judge. That 
such-and-such is red is something one might judge. It is to be met with in thinking, just as 
something’s being red is to be met with in seeing. One meets with it in meeting with 
something to which the environment matters in a certain way. Someone’s so judging is, 
again, something to be met with. It is to be met with in the environment’s mattering as 
it does to the way he thus  guides his dealings with it. In identifying something to be 
judged of a non-environment (correlatively, ways it may, or may not, thinkably be), we 
cannot appeal to such ways of mattering. For they are intrinsically environmental. 
Whether there are things to be judged of a non-environment at all, and by what such 
things might be identified, thus remain open questions.
3. Background:  Pausing between the two legs of Frege’s argument, let us ask how to 
make sense of the idea of there being such-and-such, in particular, there to be judged—
of someone judging thus and so  in his current holding of the attitude he does. When 
would such a thing be present in someone’s holding the posture he does towards 
things? Its presence would be that of something available to judge, even if only for this 
person then—available whether it had been judged or not; thus, if judged, then 
separable from the circumstance of its having been; identifiable anyway without that 
circumstance to refer to. It would represent a particular way for a thinker to expose 
himself to error; to stake his cognitive success on how things are. That particular way 
for things to matter to success would be a particular way for things to be. When may we 
sensibly suppose someone’s attitude towards things to contain as elements such 
discriminable attitudes?
A judgement would be available, even where not taken. An attitude an open 
sentence expresses—taking something to be red, say—is available to take on different 
occasions and towards different things, including ones towards which it is not.  An 
attitude expressed in a closed sentence—say, that this scarf is red—might have been 
taken even had things—even that scarf—been different.
We may speak of an attitude as there to take on various occasions only with an 
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adequate notion of same attitude  in place. Where the attitude is judging, we need an 
adequate notion of same way to judge things to be. The notion same, on its own, does not 
supply what we need here. Nor does the notion judgement, added to it. The usual 
applies here. Whether my violet singlet is the same colour as my purple shorts is not 
settled by what the same is, nor by that plus what a colour is. There are various ways of 
thinking of colours; room for various notions of same colour. Similarly for attitudes. 
Whether Sid and Pia think the same thing as to the colour of my shorts depends on 
what that thing might be. Find a sense in which they do think the same, and you ipso 
facto find something to judge in judging shorts a certain colour; something Sid and Pia 
did each judge. Fixing what judging the same thing might be and fixing a way to judge 
things come as a package.
Here, now, is an analogy (not Frege’s). For its first term, suppose it were said of a 
given proposition—say, that that pig is wallowing—that it articulates into certain 
elements: being about that pig (or a feature that makes it so); and being about 
something wallowing. What could it mean to call these elements? Wittgenstein, in 
January 1930 (see Waismann, 1979, p. 90), had this to say. An element of a proposition is 
simply an identifiable respect in which that proposition is the same as  some range of 
other propositions (that pig is grunting, that pig is snuffling, etc.): they are all thus alike. 
So it makes sense to speak of an element of a proposition only insofar as that 
proposition is part of such a range. If there were no such contrasting propositions, and if 
one could still represent that pig as wallowing, that representation would be 
unstructured, without elements. Its ‘logical form’ would be pigwallow.
The analogy’s second term starts from a thinker at a time. There is his posture 
towards things: all his sensitivities, affinities, aversions, propensities to disappointment, 
deception, gratification, triumph, and to set, change, or hold, course—his engaging with 
things as he does. For him to judge such-and-such is for this posture to articulate; to 
contain this judging as an element. Perhaps one discriminable feature of his posture is 
his judging that that pig is snuffling. Now the analogy. Just as it makes sense to speak of 
an element in a judgement only where it is present in an identifiable range of 
judgements, so it makes sense to speak of an element in a posture—here the posture-
holder’s judging thus and so—only where there is a range of postures it is (or would be) 
part of; a certain range of otherwise-different postures all alike in being, inter alia, ones 
of judging this.
An attitude thus just is a common element in postures. There are those cases of 
someone standing towards things which are alike in that they are all cases of taking this 
pig to wallow. That is one identifiable way for postures to be alike. A posture may 
recognizably  contain this  element. To judge that pig to wallow is to be exposed to a 
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certain form of error as to what is to be met with. One might, say, misjudge the viscosity of 
the ground beneath the pig. One can (sometimes) see  people to be wrong about such 
things. Their being so is to be met with. Such identifable samenesses in exposure to 
disappointment or surprise can unite a range of postures. They may thus identify 
something one might judge. Conversely, where there is  something someone might 
judge, there are such samenesses in postures. This  much must be so even if those 
samenesses are not in ways of standing towards what is to be met with; even if a 
posture could not recognizably contain them. The general point applies even for postures 
towards a non-environment. The question is what, there, a sameness between different 
postures might be.
Someone’s engagement with the environment can itself be part of the 
environment. His liability to (in)corrrectness in his cognitive ventures can be to be met 
with—as is Pia’s and Sid’s discomfiture as, arriving for talk on tropes, they find the 
doors locked. (The talk must have been on Thursday.) Their discomfiture is to be met 
with: there is no one one must be to meet it. So can its cause: the locked doors, as is its 
being cause. Pia and Sid are guiding their environmental dealings as it would take open 
doors, or, better, a talk on tropes, to put right. Such things show themselves, as does a 
ball’s being red, in what is to be met with in experience of the environment. One could, 
here, share something in common with Pia and Sid; be guiding one’s one transactions in 
ways it would take the same to put right. Such an understanding of the same, in terms of 
what would be to be met with, is itself to be met with—shared—in thought.
Where it is the environmental towards which Pia guides her dealings, rightly or 
wrongly, we gain right to a now-familiar ‘would’. Here guidance is as to what is to be 
met with, and is on or off target accordingly. The would we need—when things would 
be as Pia and Sid suppose—is already in that ‘is to be met with’, referring as it does to 
no particular meeting. They are  right if a talk on tropes would be to be met with by 
anyone suitably placed at 3. They would be right where this was to be met with. 
Someone else’s posture would contain this element in theirs if he were liable to be right 
or wrong accordingly. For Pia and Sid both to think thus and so is for ‘the same’ in 
‘think the same thing’ to have a particular sense. We have just fixed (roughly, perhaps) 
such a sense
What needs fixing is that range of circumstances in which someone would be 
holding such-and-such attitude which Pia does; that range of postures of which it would 
be part. We have just seen, in outline, how the environment can make such projects 
unproblematic. This fixing must be done somehow in the non-environmental case as 
well on pain of there being no thinking-so in a posture towards a non-environment. For 
any given way someone might judge his non-environment to be, sense must be made at 
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least of when he would be judging that; of when that would be an element in his posture 
towards his non-environment. We must still think in terms of a range of postures 
towards a (perhaps his) non-environment, of which this  judgement would be an 
element.
Engagement with a non-environment is itself part of a non-environment. A 
thought that a non-environment is thus and so cannot be identified by when it would 
misguide, or rightly guide, environmental dealings. For then it would be right or wrong 
according to how the environment was, thus a judgement as to how the environment 
was. Rather, it must be identified in terms of transactions with what (at most) only one 
thinker could be aware of, so transactions of which (at most) only one thinker could be 
aware. So that a thinker stood in the same way twice towards his non-environment—
that, say, he once, then, took, and now, again, takes, it to be thus and so, or that he 
would now take it to be thus and so if he were now thinking in such-and-such way 
could be something at most he could ever recognize. How what he thus thought might 
serve aims would be again for him alone to recognize. It would be unlike identifying an 
element in postures by its rightness or wrongness in guiding one to lecture rooms at 
certain times.
But recognizing is an ability. To recognize the same thing to have been present 
twice is not just to take it to have been. It is registering a circumstance which could still 
have obtained unregistered. The problem here is in what such a circumstance might 
consist.
What there is to recognize, in present matters, is when, on a certain 
understanding of the same, the same had occurred twice. In the environmental case a 
thinker might go wrong in taking this to have happened in either of two ways. He 
might be wrong as to what  had occurred in the one case or the other. Or he might go 
wrong as to whether what did occurred counts as the same thing twice. In the second 
case he would mistake what was to count as the same—here, as thinking such-and-
such. What is to count, here, is graspable by indefinitely many. He may be shown wrong 
by what indefinitely many would thus see. In the non-environmental case, going wrong 
in this second way cannot be like that. Someone cannot, in that way, have the wrong 
understanding of the same  as it occurs in some particular idea of his having the same 
posture twice towards his non-environment. For only he can have any  such 
understanding: only he can get in mind those things that might, or might not, so count. 
Perhaps, then, there is  no such second way for him to be wrong here: the right 
understanding of same attitude is just the one he does have; a matter of what he would, 
thus of what he does, reognize. But it cannot be like that. He was meant to grasp what his 
holding the same attitude twice would be. That he says such-and-such cannot constitute 
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grasp of anything. Which prepares us for the second leg of Frege’s argument.
The idea judge that P has sense only where someone so judging is liable to recur. 
What it would be for so judging to recur (occur twice) in postures towards a non-
environment cannot be what it would be for it to recur in the environmental case. Just as 
we saw with being red, the notion same attitude  and with it the notion judge that P, 
require new sense here. I have not yet said that no such sense could be supplied. 
Whether it could is the topic to be considered next.
4. Truth*: Frege’s treatment of red is the first term of an analogy. Here is the second:
I said that the word ‘red’ would only be applicable in the domain of 
my consciousness if it did not cite a property of things, but only 
indicated certain features of my sense impressions. So, too, if the 
words ‘true’ and ‘false’, as I understand them, didn’t concern 
something I am not the bearer of, but were fixed so as to 
characterize, somehow or other, contents of my consciousness, they 
would be applicable only in the domain of my consciousness. Thus 
would truth be limited to the contents of my consciousness, and it 
would remain doubtful whether anything similar occurred in the 
consciousness of another. (1918 pp. 68-69)
Frege tells us here that if a thought needed a bearer, then the sense (if any) in which 
‘true’ and ‘false’ applied to it would not be one on which they apply to the thoughts it is 
open to one  to think about environmental matters. By argument parallel to that in the 
case of ‘red’, this means that for ‘true’ to apply to a thought that needed a bearer, ‘true’ 
would need new sense—a sense not fixed by its sense on its environmental applications.
For a thought to need a bearer would be for it not to be met with in thought, but 
only to be met with (on suitable occasions) in so-and-so’s thought. Meeting a thought in 
thought would be thinking it, or entertaining it (considering whether things are that 
way), or thinking of things being as they are according to that thought, in thinking 
something more complex, or just grasping it—seeing what it would be for things to be 
as that thought has them. To think the thought would be to expose oneself to error in a 
certain way. For a thought not to be met with, only one thinker could expose himself in 
that way. ‘To be met with’ here has its (presently) usual subjectless sense. A thought to 
be met with is one one might meet with in thinking in the right way.
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Truth began life as part of a package. It was a particular kind of correctness 
(contrasting, e.g., with being justified), where explaining what kind of correctness that is 
and explaining what special sort of attitude judgement  is are one and the same 
enterprise. To be a judgement just is to be subject to that sort of correctness. Frege tells 
us here that to speak of thoughts which require bearers is to sunder this package. Such 
thoughts would be ‘true’ only in a new sense of the word. Which is to say that the sort 
of correctness to which they are liable is not the sort which makes for judgement. What it 
is is not fixed by what truth is. For something to be red is for its being as it is to matter in 
a certain way to what is to be met with. Correspondingly, for there to be a question as to 
whether it is red—for it to be what is liable to be red—is for what is to be met with to 
matter in a certain way to that question’s answer. Similarly, for a given judgement to be 
true is for its standing as it does towards things to matter in a certain way to what is to 
be met with. And for it to be liable to truth—for the question of its truth to arise—is for 
what is to be met with to matter in a certain way to that question’s answer. A thought 
needing a bearer is not liable to be true. No such question arises. Things being as they 
are cannot matter to its  answer. If it is liable to any sort of correctness, things being as 
they are must matter in a determinate way to whether it is correct in that sense. But 
such liability would not make for judgement. Whereas what we needed to find room for 
was precisely judgements about a non-environment. One might envision a new package: 
truth* and judgement*, each explained in terms of the other. The old package does not 
tell us how such explanation might go. Nor is it clear what interest such a new package 
might have. So we may see Frege as a bit laconic here, as if, seeing the Ching vase 
smash on the slate floor, one opines that it will never be quite the same again.
But we need worry only if a thought about a non-environment would be a 
thought that needs a bearer. The case for that starts here: to be a thought is to have a 
certain generality. It is not just that things being as they are is, or is not, things being as 
that thought has them. If things were, or had been thus, or, again, so, that would be 
things being the way they are thus thought to be. So, as already noted, for any thought 
there is an indefinitely extensive range of cases in which things being as they were 
would be things being the way they are thus thought to be. For a thought about the 
environment, a case within the range is one of to be met with being thus. For a thought 
about my non-environment, a case within the range would be, in at least indefinitely 
many instances, something only I could meet with. Only I could be acquainted with it. 
So only I could think of it that this is a case of things being the way in question. To grasp 
what it is that is so according to the thought would be, inter alia, to grasp, or be able to 
grasp, of what would be things being that way (and of what would not) that this  is 
being the way in question, this  not. Such singular thoughts (turning precisely on the 
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status of things being thus) are ones available only to me. Only I could be acquainted 
with their being thus. So only I could grasp what the generality of this thought was. So 
only I could grasp it. Which is just to say that such a thought would require me as its 
bearer. It could not be to be met with.
The initial hope was that what I encounter in my inner world may be things 
being some very same ways that what is to be encountered in the environment may be. 
I could thus judge things to be, or not, those ways. Such thoughts, the idea was, would 
not need a bearer. Though you can never see that which I judge to be this or that way, 
you could at least grasp what  I judge of it—that, say, it is red. The first leg of Frege’s 
argument dashed such hopes. To grasp what it is I was thinking in thinking something 
environmental ‘red’, you would have to grasp that new sense which I attached to ‘red’. 
But grasping the range of cases in which things would be red in this new sense is 
beyond your reach. So these hopes are dashed.
If there were a way which both environmental things and objects of my non-
environmental encounters might be, there would be a range of cases in which things 
being as they are would be their being that way, where you could think these to be such 
cases—the environmental ones—and a range such cases which you could not think to 
be such cases—the ones where objects of my non-environmental encounters were the 
relevant way. The range of which you could think would not determine what the range 
of which you cannot think should be. What you can grasp as to what the generality of 
such a thought would be leaves undetermined what its generality in fact would be. So 
you cannot grasp the thought. This is a way of appreciating just how right Frege was 
about ‘red’. It now means: thoughts about a non-environment do need a bearer.
Frege tells us: what it would be for a thought about what is to be met with to be 
true does not fix what it would be for a thought that needs a bearer to be true. A 
thought about what is not to be met with (in our present sense) would be one case of a 
thought which needs a bearer. So a thought about a thought about what is not to be met 
with, since a thought about what is not to be met with (in thought) would need a bearer. 
So a thought about such a thought that it was correct, in some form in which it might be
—call that being true*—would need a bearer. It would not be a thought that we  could 
think or grasp. A thought about a non-environment would still need to be a common 
element in some range of postures towards that non-environment. But as to which 
range of postures this was, only the bearer of the thought could so much as have, or 
grasp, a view. A thought about a non-environment could not be true. Which is to say 
that true, like red, is an environmental notion. I will return to defending this idea. But 
suppose, for a moment, it is right.
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If truth is an environmental notion, then one may judge  one’s inner world to be 
thus and so only on a new notion of judging, call it judging*. What one judges—that 
such-and-such—is a judgement  only on a new notion of judgement, judgement*. A 
judgement was to be what is liable to a certain kind of correctness: truth. But now 
correctness can be truth only on a new notion of it, truth*. It would be decided by how 
things are only on a new understanding of being decided by how things are. Can we 
introduce such notions?
To make sense of any notion is to fix (adequately) what it would be for it to be 
true  of something, or when it would be. For it to make sense is for there to be such a 
thing as when it would be true. So one thing that needs fixing here is what it would be 
for true*  to be true of something—specifically, of something not to be met with in 
thought, neither thinkable, nor graspable, except, at most, by one thinker. Which, as we 
have seen, is what a judgement about a thinker’s non-environment would be. ‘True’, if 
an environmental notion, would not apply to what ‘true*’ thus did. So nor would it 
apply to such things being true*, nor to a thought (if there were one) that something 
was true*, neither of which would be something to be met with. There is nothing it could 
be for it to be true that such a thing was true*. There is no such thing as ‘when true* 
would be true of something’. So there can be no fixing this. There is, accordingly, no 
such thing as making sense of any of the family of required new notions just listed 
above. There can be no such thing as truth*. Truth admits no substitutes. There is, 
accordingly, nothing to be judged in a would-be thought that needed a bearer. There are 
no such thoughts. The idea of merely ‘judging*’ them cannot help here. There are, thus, 
no thinkable way for a non-environment to be.
Must the notion true figure in making sense of any notion? Suppose we want to 
make sense of something being red*. Would it not do just to say what it would be for 
something to be red*, or when something would be that? Truth need not be mentioned. 
But truth need not be mentioned to figure in thought. It is what thought aims at. There is 
such a thing as something’s being red* just where there is such a thing as the range of 
cases in which something’s being as it was would be its being red*. That is just the 
range of cases in which something would be as judged in judging it red*; thus, in which 
the correctness of such a judgement would be decided solely by things being as they 
are. Correctness here, to belabour the familiar, is truth. So where we can make the right 
sense of being red*—of something’s being as it was being what was needed for its being 
red*—we can make equal sense of the idea of its being true  that the thing is red*; and 
vice-versa. For ‘red*’ we may substitute any way for things to be, notably, the supposed 
true*. We cannot make sense of its being true that something is true*. So we cannot make 
sense of something being true*, full stop.
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What it would be for something to be red is fixed just so far as it is fixed in what 
range of cases something’s being as it is would be its being red. An understanding  of 
what it would be for something to be red is formed in part by what one is prepared to 
recognize as to what, specifically, would, and what would not, count as something’s 
being red; so (in part) by thoughts, of particular cases of things being as they are, that 
this  would so count (or not)—thoughts tied to a particular circumstance as a singular 
thought is tied to an object. An understanding available to some one stretches only so 
far as there could be something he was prepared to recognize in such matters, so only so 
far as the singular thoughts, of the above sort, he could  intelligibly be credited with 
thinking. So the understandings available to us jointly of what it would be for 
something to be red—those understandings to be met with—extend only so far as what 
it would be for things to be met with to be red. That is why ‘red’s usual sense does not 
make it applicable in a non-environment. What belongs to that  range of cases of 
something’s being red leaves it open what would belong to some other range, notably, 
one including cases of a non-environment being as it is, or its inhabitants being as they 
are. For all the sharable understanding fixes, any  such range would do as well as any 
other. Red is not something something non-environmental might be.
Mutatis mutandis  for being true. Our understanding of being true extends no 
farther than cases where what is true, and its being so, are to be met with—cases in 
which one  could think, of what is true, that that  is true. Such a range stops short of 
thoughts not to be met with. Nor does it fix what range of such thoughts would be the 
true ones. By the above, then, there is nothing it would be for a thought not to be met 
with to be true. Nor does truth admit of substitutes. There is no way to introduce one. 
Things count as a certain way just where it counts as true that they are that way. So nor 
is there such a thing as when a non-environment (or what belongs to it) would be such-
and-such way.  My inner world being what it is (if that is anything) cannot consist in its 
being such-and-such ways. The last leg of Frege’s argument brings us to this point.
I have so far supposed that truth is an environmental notion. It applies only to 
thoughts which do not need a bearer: if that thought is that such-and-such, one need not 
be so-and-so to think that so.) This combines with the idea that a thought about 
something non-environmental would need a bearer to deliver this result: the idea of a 
judgement about the non-environmental has no sense. But one might resist the idea that 
truth is an environmental notion. Frege tells us:
The meaning (Bedeutung) of the word ‘true’ is unfolded in the laws 
of being true. (1918., p. 59)
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Being true is what those laws (the laws of standard logic) thus unfold. Such laws are 
purely formal. If they exhaust truth’s content, then one might suppose that so is truth. A 
purely formal notion, on might think, cannot require only environmental applications.
But this idea is true neither to Frege nor to truth. Frege’s laws of being true chart 
(mirror) connections between thoughts; specifically, inferential, notably truth-preserving 
ones. But the idea of truth begins with a thought about the relation of an attitude to its 
object—of a representation  to that which it represents as some way or another. Such 
relations, though part of truth, are not the inferential ones those laws mirror; not 
relations between judgements (or their contents). Judgement was to be that attitude liable 
to a certain kind of correctness, a kind settled solely, by things being as they are. Such 
correctness of a judgement that the wind is howling is settled solely by the presence, or 
absence, of howling wind—by meteorological conditions. The way in which reigning 
conditions settle it is one way in which a question of truth may be settled. That its truth 
is so settled by things being as they are is thus a very  small partial unfolding of the 
notion true: here is one way to be liable to truth and falsity.
To think that P is to be exposed, in a particular way, to error or vindication. In the 
environmental case error has a certain sense. An attitude towards the encounterable is in 
error, if at all, as to how things re-encounterably are. For someone so in error, that which 
he is wrong (or right) about is to be encountered in an indefinitely extensive range of 
meetings. Its being an error matters systematically, in the usual ways, to what one would 
encounter. Here we are entitled to a ‘would’ which makes sense of these ideas—as, too, 
the idea, when someone would be making this error. If circumstances were thus, one would 
still be making it; if they were so, then not. So this ‘would’ which comes along with re-
encounterability, allows identifying a specific generality for a representation of 
something as so to have: that particular generality which goes with the issue whether P. 
Only with such a generality in place can there be talk of thinking something so.
A stance towards what was not to be met with, if it were liable to a correctness 
conferred or withheld by how things not to be met with are, would not be an attitude to 
be met with in thought. Still, were there such a stance, there would be that range of 
cases in which to hold it would be to be in error, and that in which holding it would be 
being right. Here, though, the usual notions of error and vindication do not fit. Nor can 
we understand the ‘would’ in ‘would be in error (right)’ as we do where error 
(correctness) is to be met with. To make sense of the idea of judgement here we would 
need new sense for ‘error’ and for ‘would’. The point of the above argument is that 
there can be no such thing as the senses we thus need.
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Eligibility for truth goes with eligibility for error. My grasp the generality of a 
particular thought—of what range of cases would be ones of its error, what cases would 
be its correctness—extends no farther than my ability to think, of a case in the range, 
that it is such a case. So our grasp of a particular thought’s generality, so of its being 
true, extends no farther than re-encounterable postures towards the re-encounterable. 
The range of such cases of something being an error, and of something being true, leaves 
it open what range of cases would be ones of stances towards a non-environment being 
in error, or true. What error comes to where it is re-encounterable does not tell us what 
it would come to where it is not. So, too, for truth. Thus it is that truth is an 
environmental notion.
Frege’s target here is the idea of ways a non-environment may be judged to be; an 
idea of judgements true or not according to how it is. That idea aims to hold two things 
together. First, what one encounters in a non-environment is to be part of how things 
are. So to judge of it is to be correct or not according to how things (there) are. Second, 
how things there are is not integrated with how things otherwise are. It is independent 
of what one would meet with in meeting what is to be met with. The project is, perhaps, 
not absurd on its face. But it is unsurprising that it should founder.
‘How things to be met with are’ is pleonastic. ‘How things are’ would speak of 
just the same. For something to be true is for it to be vindicated by things being as they 
are. Nothing else could decide truth. Pleonastically put, for something to be true is for it 
to be vindicated by things to be met with being as they are. This is what Frege proved.
5. A Simple Disjunctivism:  Seeing is a kind of awareness of (some of) one’s 
surroundings. It furnishes occasion for responding—in attitude, affect, or action—to 
what one is thus aware of, or to its experiencing. Here is an intuition. I see the lemon on 
the sideboard; there is a way things then look. Things could be for me, visually, just as 
they thus are even were there no such lemon to be seen. This would not (just) consist in 
my being delusional—convinced of many things which simply were not so. Rather, for 
things to be visually for me just as they thus were would be for there to be something in 
the experience for me to be visually sensitive to, which I was thus sensitive to. For there 
to be just that for me to be aware of would be for things to be visually for me just as 
they were where I saw the lemon. This supposed ingredient in an experience of seeing a 
lemon and all those in which things would be just the same for me I will call a common 
factor, or CF.
So where I see the lemon, there is also a certain CF for me to be aware of. Another 
intuition: that CF could be there no matter how my surroundings were, and no matter 
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what other experiences were to be had, ‘could’ here meaning there is such a thing as 
that. Things could be that way without me being simply delusional. Being delusional is a 
matter of one’s (would-be) responses to what is going on. A CF is something there is for 
one to respond to.
Where the CF is present, either I see the lemon or I am having a perfect (visual) 
ringer for that experience. There are, the idea is, no visual clues, registering which 
would be a way of telling that I am was not seeing the lemon. There is no other way 
things ought then to look. The thought, again, is that things could be thus no matter 
how things not then experienced were arranged.
Disjunctivism is a negative thesis. It rejects the idea of a CF, present where I see the 
lemon. Perhaps where I see the lemon there is a way things visually are for me. But the 
idea of a CF is not a way of making sense of that. Nor, in general, for seeing, hearing, 
smelling, etc. A simple disjunctivism chooses a simple target. In this version the CF in 
seeing the lemon is itself an object of visual  awareness, e.g., things ((as) experienced) 
looking such-and-such way.
The crucial idea here is: things  look a certain way. It need not be that some thing 
does. On some versions of the simple version there will be such a thing—a sense datum. 
But there need not be for something to qualify as the present target. The lemon is, and, 
moreover looks, yellow and pebble grained. Those are both features it  has. If I see it, I 
take in its having them. So one might posit an ersastz-lemon, eligible to be present, and 
an object of visual awareness, no matter how the environment is in fact arranged, and 
postulate that it, too, looks yellow and pebble-grained. But also, when the lemon is 
present things look a certain way. Here ‘things’ picks out the scene in view: the lemon, 
the sideboard, the tiled floor. If the CF is things looking thus and so, ‘things’ cannot be 
that. For there need be no scene before me. Still, it might be held, things appear (look) as 
would a scene which looked a certain way. An experience may be like that; which, the 
idea is, imposes another good reading on ‘things’.
On this story, when the CF is present, things appear as if yellow and ovoid, or as if 
something yellow and ovoid were there. Now Frege’s point has application. We must be 
careful to apply the whole, and not just the first half, of his argument. Here is a 
particular way things, on the present use of ‘things’, appear. ‘Yellow and ovoid’ we are 
told. I may judge (take) them so to appear. I may thus register things appearing the way 
they in fact do. (Or, if mistakes are in the cards here, get things all wrong.) But things 
appearing as they thus do is not something to be met with. For their so appearing is, by 
hypothesis, independent of what would be met with in any other meeting with 
anything. (The motivation is: no matter how all that may be, things could  still be the 
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same for me in the particular experience I am then having. I could still have that much 
cause for taking myself to see a lemon.) So, by the first leg of Frege’s argument, ‘yellow’ 
and ‘ovoid’, in their above deployment, cannot have their usual sense (by which I mean 
all and only the sense they have on their environmental applications). (Being ovoid, for 
example, cannot here be the sort of thing one might establish, or disprove, by 
measurement. It is not what a ‘primary quality’ was meant to be.) If they are to apply at 
all here, they call for new sense. Their usual (environmental) sense does not decide 
what this new sense is to be. ‘Yellow and ovoid’? When would things, on the current 
use of things, appear (as if) that way? When would one be taking things, on this use, to 
be just that way? These questions as yet have no answer. None is to be derived from the 
environmental uses of ‘yellow’ and ‘ovoid’.
Perhaps, then, ‘yellow’ and ‘ovoid’ have some other sense, which they bear in such 
applications. The modifier ‘phenomenal’ might be (perhaps has been) meant to signal it. 
But just what are these senses? For there to be an answer to this question (forget whether 
anyone could ever give it), there would have to be an answer to the question when it 
was true of things (on the present use of ‘things’) that they were phenomenally yellow 
(or ovoid). There could be no answer to that precise question, because ‘true’ could not 
apply to judgements that things were phenomenally yellow. That is the first stage in the 
second leg of Frege’s argument. So one might try to tell the needed story here by appeal 
to some substitute notion, ‘true*’. But the second leg of Frege’s argument shows that 
there can be no such substitute notion. So there can be no such thing as ‘things being 
phenomenally yellow’. And so on in general. This completes the application of Frege’s 
argument to this simple case of disjunvtivism’s target.
6. A Wider Target: ‘Vorstellung’ is a usual translation of the word ‘idea’ as it occurs in 
18th  century British philosophy. Related uses may carry visual, or other perceptual, 
connotations. But such connotations are not essential to Frege’s use of the term. When 
Frege asks whether a thought can be a Vorstellung, he does not suppose that his question 
is already answered by what he has previously stressed, that
A thought is something non-sensory, and all perceptually 
observable things are excluded from the domain in which truth can 
come into question at all. (1918, p. 61)
Rather, what makes something an idea, or Vorstellung, in Frege’s terms, is the way in 
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which it attaches to a particular bearer; in present terms, its belonging to an inner, or a 
non-environment. This suggests that we may now widen the target susceptible to 
Frege’s core point.
The target: In the version of disjunctivism’s target on the table so far, the 
common factor—present where I see the lemon, also eligible to be present where I do 
not—is something of which, whenever present in my experience, I am, or can be, 
visually aware. There is something it is visually like. Common factors in the wider 
target need not be objects of perceptual  awareness, nor need there be anything they are 
perceptually (e.g, visually) like. The target’s more general form can be this. When I see 
the lemon I am in a certain conscious state which I could be in where there is no lemon 
to see; more generally no matter how things yet unexperienced stood. I would be in this 
state when seeing the lemon and whenever having a perfect illusion thereof. Optionally, 
if I am in it then either I see the lemon, or I am having a perfect illusion thereof (it is for 
me just as though I were seeing the lemon).
It remains to say what the common factor is wherever one is in such a state—
what is present whether or not I see the lemon. We might try this. For me (or one) to be 
in that state is for my (or one’s) experience to have a certain intentional content—that is, 
a representational content: it’s being represented as so that things are a certain way. 
Where I do see the lemon (and surrounding scene), things are as thus represented. On 
the view in question, that is meant to fix what the relevant representational content is. 
For things to be like that  is for them to be the relevant way. But my experience might 
have that content where I did not see the lemon, and, in fact, no matter what there was 
to see, or to experience, in my environment. (Byrne and Logue (forthcoming, section 5) 
present and defend this version of disjunctivism’s target.)
Experience furnishes things for us to respond to. (At least it does when it 
involves witnessing, and is not mere undergoing (cf. Hinton 1973. especially pp. 5-21)). 
It is occasion to respond to them. One may so respond in responding to one’s 
experiencing (e.g., seeing) them. The intentionalism just described is present 
disjunctivism’s target on two conditions. First, the representing just posited must lie on 
the side of what there is to respond to, and not just on the side of a response to it. It will 
do for this, for my purpose, if the representation in question does not consist in the 
subject representing things to himself as so—taking, thinking, supposing, noticing them 
to be so, etc.
Second, in having the experience the subject must be afforded awareness of 
things being so represented, in the sense that this is something he is thereby prepared, 
or equipped, to recognize about the experience: if things prove thus—e.g., there proves 
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to be no lemon—then the experience was not right; things are not as they were 
according to it; if things prove so, then they are as the experience had them. For there to 
be representing here is for there to be a way things would be if the experience were 
right; the experiencer can recognize when things are that way. Preparedness to 
recognize such things where they are so is all I want of the idea that the subject is aware 
of how, in the experience, things were represented to be.
The relevant representing thus cannot be entirely inaccessible to the experiencer, 
merely a feature of some sub-doxastic state, though this says little about what access to it 
might be like. Such access might just be things appearing to be, or as though, a certain 
way. Anyway, the idea here is that experience can be true, or untrue to how things are; 
and that the subject can grasp what being true or untrue would come to in the case at 
hand; when the experience would be true, when untrue. I see no reason to think that 
things are represented as so in subdoxastic states. But that is another story.
How things are represented to be, while the subject is in the postulated conscious 
state, is, in this sense, recognizable by him. So if things were represented differently, or 
not at all, that, too, would be recognizable. For the subject to be in that state is for things 
to be represented to be a certain way. So if he were not in that state, but rather some 
other, this, too, would be recognizable. For then things would not have been 
represented as they in fact were.
John McDowell’s version of representationalism (for example) meets both 
conditions. He tells us,
Minimally, it must be possible to decide whether or not to judge that 
things are as one’s experience represents them to be. How one’s 
experience represents things to be is not under one’s control, but it 
is up to one whether one accepts the appearance or rejects it. 
(McDowell 1994, p. 11)
A subject, confronted with a pig in plain view before him, may represent it as so to 
himself that there is a pig before him—that is, take there to be one. It is not then up to 
him whether to accept that things are as thus represented. He has  accepted it: that is 
what taking-to-be is. Nor can one decide to accept or reject what one cannot be aware 
of. (Moreover, if there is any sensible  question as to whether to accept or reject that 
things are as represented, then there is such a thing as their not being, though, also, they 
might be that way. So the representing is a common factor in cases of perception and 
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some range of others, though McDowell does not here say that this common factor could 
be present no matter how the environment were arranged.) Thus, McDowell locates the 
representing he posits so as to meet both of my conditions.
These conditions are motivated by a role which, as I understand things, 
representational content was meant to play. Suppose that, looking at a wax ringer-
lemon I take myself to see a lemon. That is understandable, reasonable: so one might 
well do, experiencing what I did. Something about the experience speaks in favour of it. 
Nor is it merely, e.g., that I cannot tell a lemon from a lime. Sight furnished no clues that 
things were otherwise.  Representational content is one way to explain  what here is 
understandable: one might well take oneself to see a lemon because things were so 
represented. There is that much reason for me so to take things. Such content is reason 
for me so to suppose only if recognizably present in the experience in the minimal sense 
set out; not, e.g, as an undetectabe part of a sub-doxastic state (which could at most 
cause my responses). More generally, such explanation works  only be appeal to 
something to respond to, not to a response, especially not one thus to be explained.
Does such representing admit of ringers? For a conscious state in which things 
are represented as being F, could there be a different one in which things are not 
represented as that way (but, perhaps, as some other way), but where, for one in this 
different state, this would be unrecognizable? The ringer state would be one in which 
things were represented as being, not F, but, say, G. But the consciousness enjoyed by 
one in the state would provide no means for him to tell that. I think I see a lemon, say. 
But it is wax. So I am wrong on that count. I think that if there is no lemon, then my 
experience presented things to me as they are not. But wrong again, though 
undetectably. What was in fact represented as so is that there was either a lemon or a 
replica before me. Does this idea make sense?
One well might take a wax ringer for a lemon. They look just the same. That 
makes this error understandable. Intentionalism is meant to relieve us of need for such 
explanation. It provides a substitute: representational content. Such content is apt to be 
available where ringers are not, e.g., in an hallucination. So if it is represented as so that 
there is a lemon, that makes it understandable that one should think so, just as a 
ringer’s looking like a lemon would.
For it to be represented that there is a lemon is not for me to think there is. I can 
distrust representations. But if there is a ringer for things being so represented, then it is 
similarly understandable that I should think things were so represented—that I should 
blame my experience for being untrue to how things are. Something must explain this 
being understandable. If intentionalism is to the rescue here, then that thing will be its 
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being represented as so in this experience that things were so represented.
Such would be detectable (recognizable) in the current minimal sense. Since 
nothing recognizable  in this ringer state marks it as a ringer (by definition), this further 
detectable feature would be shared by the ringer state, by the state in which it was 
represented as so that there was a lemon, and by some range of others in which, also, it 
was not represented as so that there was a lemon—but was  represented as so that this 
was represented as so. There would be a conscious state I am in where I see the lemon, 
also where it is merely represented as so that I do, and also in a range of cases in which 
neither of these things is so. Such a state would have two explanatory burdens. First, 
where I neither see the lemon nor is this represented as so, it explains why I might think 
it was represented as so that there was a lemon. Second, it thereby explains why I might 
think I saw a lemon. That things were so represented cannot do the job in this case. For 
things were not so represented.
The idea of ringer-representing now collides with what called for representing in 
the first place. The idea was: where I see a lemon, I also experience a common factor, 
present there, and also in all experiences which provide no ways of telling, perceptually, 
that they are not ones of seeing the lemon—all ringers for doing so. In any such range of 
cases something speaks in favour of my taking myself to see a lemon; something makes it 
understandable for me to do so. That something is to be the common factor. With 
ringer-representing, the common factor is not its being represented that there is a lemon, 
but rather its being represented that things were so represented. So this last must do  the 
explaining in all ringer cases. Nor could we rest there, or with any other determinate 
iteration of ‘It was represented that’ once ringer representing is in the cards. Whereas if 
it is disallowed, then the range of ringer cases extends no farther than those in which it 
was represented that there was a lemon. Such  representing can then be what makes 
things understandable.
If a third state were called for, there is anyway a problem as to what it ought to 
be. For then there are two states (the initial one and a ringer for it) which would in no 
way differ in what was recognizable to me about my experience if I were in them. In 
one things are represented as a way they are not if there is no lemon. In the other they 
are represented as a way this still may be—e.g., if there is a wax replica. Which of these 
states should the third state represent me as in? And why? I do not think this question 
could have an answer. I also think it points to a problem with the very idea of 
representation in experience. But I drop the point and turn, instead, to Frege.
 Frege’s point: The representations posited above can just be of the environment as 
being thus and so. The features they ascribe to it are ones for environmental things to 
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have—being red, say, in the usual sense of ‘red’. Problems raised by non-environmental 
ways for things to be do not arise yet. But our suspicions should be aroused. We have a 
perfectly adequate understanding of what it is for something to be red. If we help 
ourselves to the idea that something non-environmental might be red on that 
understanding of so being, our straightforward version of disjunctivism’s target 
becomes unproblematic. But it is problematic. We may not help ourselves to that idea. 
That is Frege’s point. Similarly, we have a perfectly adequate understanding of what it 
is for it to have been represented as so that such-and-such where this is an 
environmental matter (as where it says so in the Times). If we help ourselves to the idea 
that in a non-environment it might have been represented as so that such-and-such, on 
that  understanding of something being represented as so, then, again, all the rest is 
unproblematic. But may we help ourselves to this? Would not Frege’s point apply?
For a lemon to be on the sideboard is for the environment to be a certain way. For 
it to have been represented as so that a lemon is on the sideboard is for the environment 
to be a certain way only if that representing (its occurring, or its production) is to be met 
with. An instance of the presently postulated representing is to be met with by me, say, 
by my being in a certain conscious state. It is to be met with then by me in what my 
being in the state makes recognizable to me about it—what I am thus positioned to tell, 
in the above minimal sense, as to when things would be as, in it, things were presented. 
That things were so represented can be available only to me, then. For, conversely, that 
representing could have occurred no matter what was to be met with; no matter how 
things were of which I was not conscious in (or while) being in that conscious state.
So the postulated representing of something as so is not something to be met 
with. Which places us in familiar territory. We know what it is for it to be represented as 
so that P, e.g., in talk. Here things having so been represented—the talk’s being so to be 
taken—is something to be met with. One may make mistakes about such things. One 
may misunderstand. There are familiar ways to learn of this. Facts about the 
circumstances of the talk, about the familiar usage of the words used, about the use 
made of them in this case, may all emerge in further encounters, e.g., with the words 
used, and with those presumed to be familiar with them. There are things with the 
recognizable shape of a demonstration that things were actually represented this way, 
rather than that—that, say, Sid was not really to be taken to have been speaking of 
dinner when he said, ‘Pia had a little lamb.’ None of this could be part of what it would 
be for things to have been represented as thus and so in one of the postulated conscious 
states. Which is to say that, in this case, the expression ‘represent it as so that P’ requires 
new sense. The phenomenon it speaks of as instanced, e.g., in talk simply does not fix 
what phenomenon it would be speaking of in the case of these conscious states. That is 
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for the new sense to do.
That in such a state it was represented as so that P is meant to be the content of a 
judgement. So there is meant to be something in things being as they are on which the 
truth  of such a judgement might turn; something which, if present, would make the 
judgement true, and if absent would make it false. Something thus to judge about; 
something for its thus being represented as so to be. But the question now is on what the 
truth of such a judgement might turn. That is a question only new sense for the notion 
represent as so could answer. Which again places us on familiar ground.
If there is such a thing as representing it as so, in such a state, that P, then there is 
a range of cases in which, in such a state, that is how things would be represented. But 
the particular cases in which things were so represented in my  states of the postulated 
sort would be ones which only I could get in mind. Only I could be acquainted with the 
representing thus occurring; only I could have thoughts of it (in a given case) that it was 
thus and so. Only I could see what the relevant generality was to be here—that 
belonging to the notion represent as so that P, on its application to my (relevant) 
conscious states. So only I could grasp the thought, of some such state that I was in, that 
in it what was going on was its being represented as so that P. Again, the trouble is not 
with the notion  that P, but rather with the notion of representing as so, applied in this 
domain. Thoughts to the effect that this  is the way things are according to (the 
representing going on in) this  state would be thoughts that needed a bearer. But that 
means, as we have seen, that it could be ‘true’ only in some new sense of true. And, as 
we have also seen, there can be no such new sense. Which answers the question what 
there could be for a judgement that in such a state it was represented as so that P to 
answer to: nothing. In what way could it be beholden for correctness to things being as 
they are? In no way.
The present intentionalist version of disjunctivism’s target thus ends up in just 
the same boat as our initial more straightforward version. For the straightforward 
version it turned out in the end that there was nothing it could be to be confronting 
non-environmental red, no range of cases which were the ones of things being that way
—not even in a new sense of ‘red’, for, in the non-environmental case there is no such 
sense to be introduced. In the intentionalist case it turns out in the end that there is 
nothing it could be to confront (what turns out to be) non-environmental representing 
of it as so that P, no range of cases which would be ones of confronting that—not even 
in some new sense of ‘represent’. For, in the desired case there is no such sense to be 
had. The root trouble with sense-datum theory was not that it required non-
environmental bearers of properties like being yellow, or ovoid, or pebble-grained. It 
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was rather the prior idea of ways things non-environmentally are.
Faced with this trouble, an intentionalist might try to make his postulated 
representing something environmental—perhaps something neurological. But an 
environmental anchor, of that sort, or of any other, would re-instate the possibility of 
ringer-states, with ringers for given representing. Which, as we have seen, would 
sabotage the intentionalist project in a different way. If we were to waive this point, I 
might then need to unbracket the points I have so far waived, about the intelligibility, 
anyway, of the idea of representing without an agent. But that would be another project.
Disjunctivism’s target walks a narrow line. On the one hand, in all its forms, it 
posits something in (an) experience distanced enough from the experiencer to be 
something there to respond to, and, specifically, something to judge about: something 
one can take to be one way or another, rightly or wrongly according to how it anyway is
—thus, something fit to decide that correctness to which judgement is peculiarly liable. 
On the other, this something is to be so closely tied to the experiencer that it would not 
be there at all but for the experience it is part of. Frege’s point is: this trick cannot be 
turned. In targeting idealism, Frege targeted—most strikingly, perhaps, but not 
exclusively—the idea of non-environmental sensory objects of judgement. It is 
noteworthy that intentionalism falls within his target’s scope.
7. Varieties of Attitude: We do have inner lives. There is something it is like to be me, 
something it is like to experience what I do (on an occasion). I frequently respond to my 
inner life. Such responses may be part of what is to be met with, as when I say, 
‘Everything is spinning.’ What is thus to be met with may be important—without, for 
all that, being a judgement  as to how things are for me alone. If  they are responses to 
what I alone could be aware of—towards something otherwise inaccessible being as it is
—then their standing as they do towards what they do is not something to be met with. 
They cannot, thus, be judgements. So much for disjunctivism’s target. In an experience 
of perceiving (e.g., seeing) things, we do not encounter what, on the one hand, there 
could be to be encountered anyway, regardless of the layout of the scene in view (thus, 
something not to be met with) and something which is, or not, determinate ways it may 
be judged to be. Perception is an encounter with the environment, in which we are more 
or less sensitive, more or less accurately, to its being as it is. It is occasion for responding 
to just that. It supplies sensory awareness of nothing else to judge about.
Using ’inner sense’ for a mode of awareness whose objects are non-
environmental, John McDowell has said,
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If we can make out that judgements of “inner sense” are about 
anything, it has to be that they are about impressions of “inner 
sense” themselves, not about something independent of which the 
impressions constitute awareness.
This is a very difficult area. Wittgenstein himself sometimes 
seems to betray an understandable wish to duck the difficulties. 
What I have in mind here is the fact that he sometimes seems to toy 
with denying that self-ascriptions of sensations are assertions, 
articulation of judgements about states of affairs at all. (1994, p. 22)
For judgements of ‘inner sense’ to be about impressions of inner sense is for them to 
turn, for correctness, on how those impressions are, namely, whether they are thus and 
so. I have denied that judgement could be like that—that there are such things for it to 
turn on. McDowell seems to suggest that this is ‘ducking difficulties’ and a cop-out. But 
it is not. We have feelings, which sometimes matter deeply to us, to which we respond 
in ways which matter to what we thus feel. And, perhaps, sometimes vice-versa. It is 
just that what we respond to does not matter to our responses in the way a judgement as 
to an impression’s being thus and so would.
McDowell is nearly right when, crediting Miles Burnyeat, he says,
In ancient scepticism, the notion of truth is restricted to how things 
are … in the world about us, so that how things seem to us is not 
envisaged as something there might be truth about … whereas 
Descartes extends the range of truth and knowability to the 
appearances on the basis of which we naively think we know about 
the ordinary world. In effect, Descartes recognizes how things seem 
to a subject as a case of how things are; and the ancient sceptics’ 
concession that appearances are not open to question is transmuted 
into the idea of a range of facts infallibly knowable by the subject 
involved in them. (1986/1998, p. 239)
Descartes, McDowell tells us, misconstrues Pyrrhonian appearances as judgements—a 
first step on his road to ruin. But appearances may be any of several things. (Conflating 
these can make one impose the shape of an attitude on what is not one.) The 
appearances on the basis of which  we naively think we know about the world are 
28
29
30
appearances which the world, and its denizens, have. These are not attitudes. For 
Descartes to go wrong in the cited way would be for him to make an attitude of 
something that is not. Whereas Pyrrhonian appearances are to be precisely non-truth-
evaluable attitudes. Something may appear to me to be thus and so not in my detecting 
its so appearing (which would bring back into the picture just what the Pyrrhonians 
wanted to eliminate: to detect is, inter alia, to take something to be so), but rather in my 
holding a certain view. The Pyrrhonian suggestion was that this may be a non-truth-
evaluable view—not judgement: no matter how things are, for all that, things so 
appeared to me. Such appearances, they held, may substitute for thinking-so in guiding 
action. I may, not unreasonably, move out of the cart’s path because of how things seem 
to me. So what the Pyrrhonians meant to point to was precisely a way for an attitude to 
matter (inter alia to conduct) without being a judgement.
In a way, then, ancient sceptics were one with Frege. There is not always room for 
judgement, nor need there be. A judgement is beholden to how things are in a way there 
is not always room for. The ancient’s seemings-to-one-to-be are not so beholden. They 
are attitudes available anyway even where judgement is not. If a seeming to be cannot 
be false, this does not mean that there is judging  which is immune to error. To 
understand inner life we need to see the various ways in which such attitudes may be 
important.
For this we can again turn to Frege. Describing a patient in pain Frege says,
The patient who has a pain is the bearer of this pain … the doctor 
who treats him, who thinks about the cause of this pain, is not a 
bearer of the pain. … The patient’s pain may correspond to an image 
in the doctor’s consciousness; but this is not the pain, and not that 
which the doctor is concerned to remove. Perhaps the doctor 
consults another. Then we need to distinguish: first, the pain, whose 
bearer is the patient; second, the first doctor’s image of it, third the 
second doctor’s image of it. This image belongs, of course, to the 
contents of the second doctor’s consciousness, but is not the object 
of his thought, though perhaps an aid to that thought, as a symbol 
might be. Both doctors have as common object [of thought] the 
patient’s pain, whose bearer they are not. One can see from this that 
not only a thing, but also an idea, can be the common object of 
thought of people who do not have that idea. (1918, p. 73)
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The patient is the one in pain. Only he has the pain. Only he undergoes  his experience. 
But (Frege’s point is) his having the pain may be part of the environment: something to 
be met with (in space), e.g., by the two doctors; something thus, and thereby, to be 
judged about. His being in pain is to be met with in space; judgements as to his pain are 
thus to be met with in thought. The patient’s attitudes towards his pain may be to be 
met with. But they need not be judgements  as to the features of that which is not to be 
met with, and which he  encounters in being in pain. There are other ways for these 
attitudes of his to relate to his being in pain. They need not be judgements at all.
The point generalizes. Wherever someone is, psychologically, a certain way, his 
so being is a feature of the environment. It is something to be met with, not merely 
something to be met with by the subject. It is the sort of thing that may be observable, or 
ascertainable, where these are environmental notions. Frege shows us why this must be 
right. Someone’s attitudes towards how it is for him—towards his undergoing, or 
feeling, sensing, etc., what he does—may be an important part of what is to be met with 
in his being, psychologically, thus and so. The sort of role such reactions play in his so 
being depends very much on the case in hand. But there is a wide range of roles those 
reactions could not play if they were judgements  as to how things were with him. It is 
important that there are other things for such attitudes to be.
Where someone’s being thus and so is part of the environment, his being so may 
be something he encounters in a way no one else can. Insofar as it is his so being—
something environmental—which he thus encounters, he encounters something he can 
judge  about. Some of our attitudes towards ourselves may sometimes correctly be so 
understood. I may encounter myself sitting, or speeding up as I walk across the quad 
(late again). I thus encounter something there is for me to judge: I have started to walk 
very fast. I do not mean here to set limits to what can be so understood. I merely point 
to the importance of understanding some of our attitudes towards ourselves otherwise
—an importance I can here no more than gesture at.
There is, notably, the case of pain. Pain is, notoriously, the sort of thing one minds 
(even if one would welcome it, administered by a lover), the sort of thing which, if 
severe enough, one would find awful. How one minds one’s pain may be integral to its 
being the sort of pain it is. When the patient says, ‘It is becoming unbearable’, that may 
express, or manifest, not canniness, nor acuity in observation, but rather a response in 
which its being unbearable pain he experiences (in part) consists.
Again, walking home, I say to you, ‘I think there is enough beer at home to last 
the match.’ I express an attitude towards my refrigerator, which is, unproblematically, 
judgement. In saying what I think, I may  also, sometimes, for some purposes, be 
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viewable as manifesting an attitude towards my being as I am. My response towards my 
standing towards the world as I do may express acknowledgement of the world’s, or 
experience’s, power over me; my lack of choice as to what to think. To take there to be 
beer at home is precisely to lack such choice. My acknowledgement, or acquiescence in 
the world’s power here may thus just be part of what it is for me to think so.
Or, again, something tasting not at all like chocolate may, just for a moment, taste 
of (hints of) chocolate to me. It seemed  to me to have such hints. Is this seeming an 
attitude, or a matter of its tasting, momentarily, a certain way? Well, perhaps, inter alia, 
an attitude (in which case not one of judging). But then, perhaps also, something’s 
tasting thus and so to me. Perhaps, so responding, in the right surroundings, just is part 
of things so tasting.
Frege set himself consciously and with determination against a view of 
perception which was pervasive in the 19th century, and much of the last, and which, I 
have tried to show, is still operative in the view the rejection of which just is 
disjunctivism. In its full traditional form, it has a very odd feature. It begins with the 
question what we see (hear, etc.), and ends with, as answer, objects of awareness which 
could not possibly be objects of sight (or etc.) As Frege puts it,
Ideas cannot be seen, or felt, neither smelled nor tasted, nor heard.
I take a walk with a companion. I see a green meadow; I have 
thereby a sense-impression of green. I have it, I do not see it. (1918, 
p. 67)
Frege saw that he needed an environment, and thus perception, and not merely 
sensation, if there was to be something for logic to be about. Not that logic applies only 
to environmental thoughts. But rather, only given an environment for thinkers can the 
notion of judgement gain a foothold. The position disjunctivism opposes need not go so 
far as to propose as objects of perception what could not be that—what does not belong 
to an environment. But in positing perceptual experiences outside of an environment it 
strays beyond the bounds of judgement. The oddity it thus collapses into entirely 
parallels that strange idea of seeing what could not be in sight.1
Charles Travis
King’s College London
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1  Those without whom not are, this time, as not unusually, Mike Martin and Joan 
Weiner. Thanks also to Alex Byrne, Charles Parsons, Sharon Berry and Eylam Ozultun.
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